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Can planning safeguard against mining and resettlement risks? 
 
1. Introduction 
Mining is often undertaken in parts of the world where the development and expansion of 
mining projects can only proceed if people are moved out of the way. Numerous studies have 
demonstrated that mining-cased displacement and resettlement, especially when it is 
involuntary, can be overwhelmingly detrimental to host communities (Alexandrescu, 2015; 
Bennett and McDowell, 2012; Mathur, 2008). Displacement and resettlement of human 
populations is steadily emerging as one of the global mining industry’s most complex 
challenges. Research indicates that major performance and knowledge gaps exist around the 
most basic dimensions of resettlement planning (Downing, 2002; Owen and Kemp, 2016). 
The global mining industry’s peak international body cites international safeguard policies 
and performance standards in guidance to its member companies for managing resettlement 
risks (ICMM 2015). However, questions must be asked about the application of institutional 
mechanisms in safeguarding against the more egregious harms created by large-scale 
development. 
 
Outside of mining, the relationship between displacement-related risk and harm to affected 
persons is well documented (Oliver-Smith, 2005; Scudder, 2005; McDonald-Wilmsen and 
Webber, 2010; Bennett and McDowell, 2012, Cernea, et al. 2016; De Wet, 2015; Price, 
2015). Where displaced people have minimal control over the circumstances that result in 
their displacement, the potential for negative impacts, including trauma, is high. Where 
displacement is caused by conflict or natural disaster, opportunities for resettled people to re-
gain some control over their lives are strongest in the post-displacement phase of the disaster 
event. Traditionally, the post-displacement phase has been the focal point for planned 
interventions. When displacement occurs through planned development projects, a question 
exists about whether interventions can be devised in the pre-displacement phase (and 
implemented throughout the project lifecycle) to off-set the traumatic effects of displacement. 
Proponents of the planning approach argue that harms to displaced persons can be 
significantly reduced through early risk analysis, resourcing and timely intervention (Cernea, 
2000).  
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The expectation that planned resettlement interventions outside of disaster-type 
circumstances can make a meaningful difference to the experience and impact of 
displacement forms the basis of contemporary international safeguard policies (e.g. The 
World Bank Operational Policy 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement) and performance 
standards (e.g. the International Finance Corporation’s Environmental and Social 
Performance Standard 5 on Involuntary Land Acquisition and Resettlement) for displacement 
caused by development. The basic premise of these institutional mechanisms is that when key 
elements of a displacement are known in advance, the timing, nature and intensity of the 
displacement event can be forecasted. It follows that with this knowledge, developers will 
consult with affected people, analyse the context, identify relocation sites and negotiate 
replacement land, prepare housing and other infrastructure ahead of relocation taking place, 
and make allowances for food and water security and other livelihood essentials.  
 
As we highlight below, like other forms of large-scale development, there is an embedded 
assumption that large-scale mining offers an ability to plan for resettlement. This assumption 
has carried over into the corporate policy statements of many large, and an increasing number 
of mid-tier, mining companies. The effectiveness of planning for the purposes of managing 
displacement risks is not universally agreed. On one hand, mainstream development projects 
are considered to be a “given” and displacement an “unfortunate” consequence to be 
managed. This perspective is described by Dwivedi (2002, p.712) as “reformist-managerial”. 
According to Dwivedi, reformist-managerialists factor displacement into the development 
process.  Having accepted displacement as an unavoidable consequence of development, the 
focus for manageralists then shifts to the devising of effective plans and strategies to control 
resettlement risk and reduce negative harms and impacts. On the other hand, is what Dwivedi 
calls the “radical-movementist” perspective. This perspective depicts displacement as a 
“crisis of development”, where the moral legitimacy of the mainstream development agenda 
is called into question. From the radical perspective, planning has no legitimate role because, 
in essence, a planned injustice is still an injustice. What these divergent perspectives 
represent is by no means trivial.  
 
Ours is not the first effort at trying to engage the problem of divergent perspectives in 
development-caused displacement. In their research, Penz et al. (2011) introduced what they 
call the “responsibility approach” to managing the dilemmas of resettlement. This approach 
combines human rights-based concepts and structures with the methods of development 
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ethics. Penz et al. constructed a philosophical space that allows the reader to temporarily 
transcend the trade-off between human rights at the local level and economic development at 
the country level. This space provides an opportunity to ask questions about the ethics of 
assigning rights and responsibilities to a range of different actors. For our purposes, a key 
question is the extent to which the practical elements of the current institutional mechanisms 
– in this case planning – are effective in safeguarding against the impacts and risks of 
displacement caused by large-scale mining development. 
 
This article develops in six sections. In the following second section we describe and contrast 
institutional mechanisms in place at the global level for the protection of displaced persons. 
In this second section we examine the relationship between the present day institutional 
mechanisms and displacement risks. The third section of the article provides an analysis of 
issues associated with the application of resettlement planning norms in the context of 
mining. Section four explores the implications of engaging with the radical critique of 
development caused displacement and resettlement and in section five we offer some 
preliminary thoughts on what might constitute ‘responsible planning’ in mining and 
resettlement. In section six we conclude that safeguarding against resettlement risks is 
challenged by an industrial context that is inherently volatile, where future land acquisition is 
difficult to predict and therefore plan for. 
2. Institutional mechanisms for safeguarding against risk and trauma 
Displacement, whether caused by conflict, disaster or development, results in crisis-like 
conditions for the people who experience it (Oliver-Smith, 2009). In this section we provide a 
brief overview of different categories of displaced persons and compare the institutional 
mechanisms in place to protect them from crisis conditions. 
Scholars have typically categorised displaced persons based on the primary cause of the 
displacement. Four primary categories include ‘conflict’, ‘natural disaster’, ‘environmental 
conservation’ and ‘development’. These categories are then grouped according the whether 
the cause of the displacement was ‘planned’ or ‘unplanned’ (Chimhowu and Hulme, 2006; 
Cernea, 1990; Cernea and McDowell, 2000). Research and policy surrounding unplanned 
forms of displacement is the most developed and most extensively canvassed in the current 
literature base. Notwithstanding the recent interest in climate-induced displacement (Bronen, 
2011; Biermann and Boas, 2010; Reuveny, 2007), the focus on unplanned displacement has 
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centred primarily on displacement caused by armed conflict (Mowafi, 2011; Kondylis, 2010; 
Mels, et al,. 2010; Ibanez and Velz, 2008; Nafziger et al., 2002). Arguably this category of 
displaced persons has received the greatest attention owing to both to the scale of 
displacement and the traumatic and violent conditions under which the displacement occurs.   
Forced migrants, according to Schmeidl and Jenkins (2003, p71), are composed of two 
groups: “refugees who have left their country of nationality, typically because of a well-
founded fear of persecution or threats to public order, and the internally displaced who have 
been similarly uprooted but remain within their own country”. Schmeidl and Jenkins are 
cautious in their estimates of global trends, but note a “significant growth of forced migrants 
since the late 1970s, peaking at over 40 million in the early 1990s, declining to around 27 
million in 1998, and then increasing again to around 33 million in 1999”. These figures map 
directly to the “rise and decline of internal armed conflicts and ‘state failures’”, reinforcing 
the conclusion that “internal armed conflict and violence are the major immediate sources of 
forced migration” (2003, p78). 
The presence of trauma among refugees and internally displaced persons is firmly 
established. The need for an international systems of protection for persons fleeing conflict or 
disaster is reflected in the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(1951), the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) and through the 
operationalisation of protection and resettlement processes developed under the aegis of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). While institutional mechanisms 
exist at the global level to protect against development caused displacement (including 
mining), they do not have the anywhere near level of recognition or legal status as those 
established under the United Nations Convention for Refugees.    
By contrast, displacement caused by development is regarded as ‘planned’ because the cause 
of the displacement is a predictable, intentional, scheduled and largely regulated event. 
Global figures on the scale of displacement caused by development have been estimated to be 
approximately 15 million people annually (Cernea and Mathur, 2008). It is generally assumed 
that these figures include people displaced by mining projects. However, global estimates for 
mining caused displacement and resettlement are unknown owing to a lack of sector-wide 
research (Owen and Kemp, 2015). The remoteness of many mining projects and reluctance 
by mining companies to make details of their resettlement activities available to the public 
adds to the difficulty of arriving at a plausible global estimate. Based on an evolving database 
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of mining and resettlement cases developed by Owen and Kemp (2015), approximately 
125,000 – 150,000 persons were displaced by 58 projects between 1990 and 2014.1   
At the international level, the most directly comparable institutional mechanisms to the 
UNHCR convention for displacement caused by development are the World Bank 
Operational Policy (OP) 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement (2001) and the International 
Finance Corporation’s Environmental and Social Performance Standard (PS) 5 on 
Involuntary Land Acquisition and Resettlement (2012).2 The initial function of the OP 4.12 
and PS5 was to identify pre-determined categories of displacement risk to ensure that lenders 
were aware of the potential social risks associated with their investment. The World Bank’s 
policy was originally developed as instructions for World Bank Group staff. It was not until 
the IFC extended its performance standards to project proponents that they became relevant 
to private sector investors such as global mining companies.  
While the World Bank and IFC have faced criticism over controversial development projects 
and their handling of human displacement caused by large-scale development, numerous 
global mining companies have endorsed the principles, even where they do not have an 
institutional relationship with the IFC as a lender or equity partner. The IFC PS5 on 
Involuntary Land Acquisition and Resettlement, for example, is referenced in the corporate 
policy statements of Anglo American, Rio Tinto, Glencore, BHP Billiton, AngloGold 
Ashanti, Newmont and Barrick Gold. Civil society organisations indicate that the IFC PS 
standards reflect a “minimum floor that any environmentally and socially sensitive project 
should meet” (Friends of the Earth 2002, cited in Sarfaty 2005). Corporate alignment with the 
requirements of these institutional mechanisms gives the impression of a strong industry 
commitment to human displacement and resettlement. However, institutional accountability 
and enforcement measures are weak, particularly when there is no client-lender relationship 
and commitments are entirely voluntary.   
                                                 
1
 We offer this figure tentatively noting that the database does not contain a complete record of mining and 
resettlement events. This sample includes only those cases where reliable data exists. Within the 58 projects 
identified, 25,129 households were displaced. The range 125,000-150,000 is the result of an assumed 5-6 
persons per household. We note here that this represents a small fraction of the likely overall picture of 
displaced persons given the large number of global mining projects. According to a recent report by the ICMM 
(2012), there were approximately 50 global companies with assets exceeding US$10 billion; 100 senior 
companies, with assets in the range of US$3 billion - 10 billion; 350 intermediate companies with assets in the 
range of US$1 billion - US$3 Billion; and 1,500 junior producers with assets in the range of US$500 million to 
US$1 billion. Companies identified as junior producers are considered often to have only one mine. The exact 
global number of formal mining operations is difficult to determine. Suffice to say that the member companies 
of the ICMM alone represent approximately 800 operations globally.  
2
 The World Bank Operational Policy (OP) 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement (2001) is currently under review. 
Concerns have been expressed about the dilution of the policy and the implications for project-affected people. 
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3. Application of planning safeguards to mining and resettlement 
We have established that the opportunity to plan prior to the displacement event distinguishes 
development caused displacement from disaster types of displacement. It is also clear that 
efforts by the global mining industry to align with contemporary institutional mechanisms 
imply that there is a strong institutional response to mining caused displacement and 
resettlement. Given the opportunity to plan, the mining industry’s commitments to global 
benchmarks, and the evidence of harm, the degree to which planning is able to serve as a 
protective mechanism for project-affected people becomes a critical question. In this light, 
the application of existing institutional mechanisms to mining is a primary concern. 
We have argued that mining resettlements have unique features that distinguish them from 
other forms of development caused displacement and resettlement (Owen and Kemp, 2015). 
These features include the nature of incremental land access, cohabitation between mines and 
communities, patterns of leveraging for compensation and associated socio-economic inter-
dependencies, and the complexities of governance arrangements that congeal around mining 
operations. The pace and scale at which mining activities expand or contract, and the 
distribution and impact of its ‘footprint’ influence the industry’s ability to adapt to changing 
and uncertain circumstances. The variability of dynamic and interactive factors in any given 
operating context raise questions about the degree to which mining and resettlement can be 
considered a ‘planned’ activity.  
It is well established that the global mining industry exists in the context of high stakes 
uncertainty where total land use requirements for life-of-mine cannot always be known in 
advance. Volatility in commodity markets routinely results in projects being suspended, 
deferred or significantly altered when prices or conditions are seen as unfavourable. At the 
other extreme, projects can be ramped up or fast-tracked when the market turns. Other 
dynamics such as social conflict over resource extraction and the insecurities associated with 
‘resource nationalism’ and the role of the state further increase the difficulty in predicting 
when, where and under what conditions a mining development will proceed.   
Mining companies buffer their business against these uncertainties by growing and expanding 
on an incremental basis. This enables companies to avoid the risk of sinking too much capital 
in the early stages of mine life, and leave their options open to take advantage of 
opportunities if they emerge later in the development lifecycle. The ‘brownfield’ effect, 
whereby land is secured on an ‘as needed’ basis, rather than as a ‘front end’ activity (Owen 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
7 
 
and Kemp, 2015) is of particular interest to resettlement planning. Banks (2013) highlights 
the impacts of this approach using the Porgera mine in the Enga Province of Papua New 
Guinea (PNG). At permitting in the 1980s, the size and nature of Porgera’s original resource 
was not known. A rising gold price and progressive improvements in technology prompted a 
pattern of ‘stop-start’ land acquisition, which has continued for more than 25 years. In 
mining, the operating context can restrict the ability to forecast land use requirements with 
precision, which in turn limits the ability to plan for resettlement.  
Even in circumstances where planning may be limited, there is nonetheless greater 
opportunity to plan for mining resettlements than in disaster-type scenarios.3 Timeframes 
may be tight, and the exact timing and scope of resettlement unclear, but there is always a 
‘notice period’ where a project applies for permits, negotiates land access or otherwise 
notifies land owners of an intent to acquire land.4 There is more often than not a window of 
opportunity, however limited, to prepare for displacement and plan for resettlement. In the 
following paragraphs, we explore three key elements of mining and resettlement planning as 
reflected in the requirements of contemporary institutional mechanisms, primarily the IFC 
PS5. These elements are (i) control over the planning process, (ii) approach to remediation, 
and (iii) accountability and enforcement.  
 
(i) Control over the planning process 
 
Present day international safeguards and performance standards for planned resettlement 
position developers as the central actor. Resettlement is considered to be ‘planned’ when 
developers act with foresight and intent in resettlement processes. These safeguards and 
standards require foresight on social risk and a demonstration of intent to avoid or minimise 
harm to project-affected people.5 There is also a set of expectations relating to large scale 
development and the engagement of local communities in terms of disclosure of information, 
                                                 
3
 Unless there is a mining disaster, such as the collapse of the tailings dam at the Samarco mine in the Minas 
Gerias state of Brazil in November 2015. This catastrophic event resulted in the loss of lives and hundreds of 
homes as mine waste spread into the Doce River, affecting numerous communities and the natural systems on 
which they depend. These circumstances mirror displacement by natural disaster. 
4
 Unless residents are summarily evicted without notice. These circumstances equate more closely to 
displacement by disaster. 
5
 The IFC’s PS5 (2012, p.1) states that “where involuntary resettlement is unavoidable, it should be minimized 
and appropriate measures to mitigate adverse impacts on displaced persons and host communities should be 
carefully planned and implemented”. 
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consultation, meaningful participation and benefit sharing.6 When the developer is a private 
sector actor, the state will typically delegate these responsibilities through the regulatory 
process; but in essence, resettlement planning remains a developer-centric process. 
 
This planning model effectively establishes where control over the resettlement process will 
be located. Here we distinguish between control over discrete elements of the resettlement 
and control of an entire resettlement process, the latter reflecting an ability to control or 
engineer the final outcome. The incapacity of developers to cope with the sheer complexities 
of mining resettlements has been flagged by Gilberthorpe and Banks (2012). Given the high 
level of complexity, one could argue that the number of variables associated with ‘known’ or 
seemingly ‘stable’ resettlement contexts negates the prospect of ultimate or total control for 
any one actor. Control over discrete elements of the process, on the other hand, allows 
developers to control some aspects of what is done, with who, and how (rather than what is 
achieved). In this sense, international safeguard policies and performance standards 
encourage companies to self-direct baselines studies, impact assessments and resettlement 
plans, including risk mitigation, livelihood restoration, and remedy processes. Where 
companies are prepared to expand the scope of local participation, the decision to do so, and 
indeed the level of control offered, stems from the developer.  
 
Retaining control over discrete aspects of the resettlement process offers options for 
managing business risk. Companies are able to adjust resources, timing and effort on an ‘as 
needed’ basis. If an otherwise profitable mining operation becomes marginal due to a decline 
in commodity prices for example, resourcing for livelihood restoration programs can be put at 
risk. Likewise, plans for land acquisition to enable further development of the project may be 
suspended until market conditions are more favourable, often keeping families in limbo for 
years (Flynn and Vegara, 2015; Hemer, 2015).  If the market turns, companies can elect to 
pay a premium for rapid access to strategic land holdings. The ability to monitor performance 
as mining companies adjust resettlement processes to suit market conditions rests with 
governments, communities and, in some cases, lenders. Experience shows, however, that the 
                                                 
6
 The IFC’s Guidance note for PS5 (2012, p.11) states that “informed participation involves organized and 
iterative consultation, leading to the client’s incorporating into its decision-making process the views of the 
affected households and communities on matters that affect them directly, such as the identification or project 
alternatives to minimize the need for resettlement, proposed resettlement planning milestones and mitigation 
measures (e.g., alternative resettlement site selection, eligibility criteria, design and layout of replacement 
housing and social amenities, timing of relocation and identification of vulnerable persons with the Affected 
Community), the sharing of development benefits and opportunities, livelihood restoration plans and 
resettlement implementation issues.”  
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ability of any of these actors to identify and address shortfalls that the planning window can 
accommodate can often be highly problematic.  
 
(ii) Approach to remediation  
 
Integral to a planned approach to resettlement are the related notions of ‘remediation’ and 
‘remedy’. International safeguards and standards for planned resettlement require remediation 
for loss or harm resulting from displacement through compensation and livelihood restoration 
initiatives.7 The safeguard policies and performance standards also recommend a formal 
remedy process to address grievances raised by project-affected people.8 The presence of 
remedy is an explicit acknowledgement that not all social risks can be predicted and that 
there must be legitimate and accessible pathways to respond to issues that emerge in the 
course of the resettlement. Where there are gaps in the remedy landscape, the safeguards and 
standards encourage developers to establish grievance mechanisms at the project level.  
 
In many contexts, access to remedy can constrained by external factors. Single party states 
for example, may not offer trusted pathways for resettled people to lodge complaints or to 
pursue grievances (Kemp and Owen, 2014; Vo, 2015). Neither do these jurisdictions 
necessarily enable resettled people to express discontent. Public opposition and civil protest 
about resettlement can in some instances trigger violence through state repression. In 
democratic societies, resettled people can more readily reach out to non-state actors to profile 
their grievances. In lieu of a trusted grievance mechanism at the local or national level, 
herders resettled by the Oyu Tolgoi mine in Mongolia brought their concerns to the IFC’s 
Compliance Adviser Ombudsman for a full investigation. Likewise, herders displaced by 
national mining company Ukhaa Khadag (UHG), lodged a formal complaint with the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for failure to identify displaced 
households and provide adequate compensation (EBRD, 2013). 
 
Underpinning the requirements for remediation and remedy is an assumption that developers 
are able to diagnose loss, harm and grievance brought about by resettlement. Neither mining 
companies nor the enabling institutions (e.g. governments and financial institutions) upon 
                                                 
7
 For example, IFC PS5 (2012, p.3) states that “when resettlement cannot be avoided, the client will offer 
displaced communities and persons compensation for loss of assets at full replacement cost and other assistance 
to help them improve or restore their standards of living or livelihoods.” 
8
 For example, IFC PS5 (2012, p.4) requires the client to “establish a grievance mechanism consistent with 
Performance Standard 1 as early as possible in the project development phase” 
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which the industry relies demonstrate consistent levels effectiveness in this area.9 An internal 
World Bank Group (2014) review of involuntary resettlement projects between 1990 and 
2010, for example, highlights a lack of specificity in the diagnostic processes needed to 
predict social risk and understand emerging issues. In response to the review, in 2015, The 
Bank’s President, Jim Yong Kim, himself admitted that oversight of those projects often had 
“poor or no documentation, lacked follow through to ensure that protection measures were 
implemented” and that some projects were “not sufficiently identified as high-risk for 
populations living in the vicinity”(World Bank, 2015).  
 
Not to be overlooked is the internal audit and compliance processes attached to the 
international safeguard policy and performance standards themselves. Audits of client 
performance are intended to provide a ‘check point’ for assessing whether loss or harm is 
being remediated and legitimate community grievances resolved to close-out. For more than 
a decade, the Ahafo gold mine in the Brong Ahafo region of Ghana adhered to the IFC’s 
audit regime as part of its loan conditions for the Ahafo South Project Phase One 
resettlement, and continued this process after the institutional relationship with the IFC had 
ceased. After years of voluntarily audits an independent completion report was undertaken 
(Barclay and Salam, 2015) showing that by international standards, the project had met 
significant targets in most of the key areas relating to livelihood restoration. Ahafo is a 
special case internationally, having successfully progressed a resettlement project to final 
completion based on the criteria contained in the IFC Performance Standards. The authors 
note that between 70 and 75 per cent of displaced farmers have been provided opportunities 
for livelihood restoration. This, by international comparison is in fact a good result. However, 
it does raise an important question about success measures for resettlement in mining, when 
in an otherwise exemplary case, the livelihoods of one quarter of the resettled population 
have not been restored.     
     
(iii) Accountability and enforcement 
 
Given the industry context that we have outlined above, the consequences of poor 
resettlement planning and implementation can often be difficult to determine. The radical 
                                                 
9
 Developers also employ ‘corrective action plans’ or ‘remedial action plans’ in instances where resettlement 
projects have resulted in poor outcomes. Given the private nature of resettlement planning, monitoring and 
evaluation, it is not possible to determine the prevalence of this particular practice. Moreover, little is known 
about what triggers a corrective plan, the steps taken in developing the plan, or its alignment with global 
resettlement planning norms.  
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view is that the dynamics of displacement cannot be mediated so as to control for the material 
harm experienced by displaced persons. The risk discourse advanced by Dwivedi’s 
‘managerialists’ suggests that development projects can in fact employ planning instruments 
to moderate and perhaps even control for untoward outcomes in the process.  
 
Private developers are typically reluctant to document failures associated with their projects. 
In some spheres these consequences are treated as ‘externalities’ or an accepted result of 
large-scale development. Whether or not the international safeguards and standards for 
planned resettlement are considered to be effective, both the World Bank policies and IFC 
standards explicit reject the ‘externality’ view. Private sector responsibility for planning, 
implementation and remediation of development caused displacement is clearly laid out. 
Where we take issue is with accountability and enforcement of these norms.   
 
Presently, the formal implications for non-compliance, even where there is a client-lender 
relationship are minimal. The resettlement at the Goldridge Mine in the Solomon Islands was 
consistently found to be in non-compliance. Despite having the IFC as the lender, few 
observable improvements were made to bring conditions for affected people into closer 
alignment with the performance standards (Owen and Weldegiorgis, 2011a; Owen and 
Weldegiorgis, 2011b).10 When companies fail to comply with the performance standards or 
fail to mitigate resettlement risks, the burden of risk and impact will most often transfer 
directly to the affected population. Recent research examining the effects of social risk in 
mining indicate that the transfer of burden is not a one-off event (Gilberthorpe and Banks, 
2012). Communities that experience material harms from mining projects are themselves 
reluctant to shoulder the burden of project-caused risk and will seek to push the responsibility 
back to the developer or the government. The cost of social conflict, sustained leveraging, or 
high-profile court cases can be substantial for the developer, both in the short and long term 
(Franks et al., 2014).  
 
While the costs of managing a failed displacement and resettlement process can be high for 
private sector developers, few developers consider this at the onset of project planning. 
Currently there are several high-profile and high-cost cases of poor resettlement planning and 
                                                 
10
 A desktop view of the IFC’s project list for Mining, Minerals, Metals, Gems and Industrial Ore indicates a 
portfolio of 46 active projects in 31 countries worldwide. See IFC Projects Database: 
http://ifcextapps.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/$$Search?openform (accessed: 17.07.2015) 
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implementation. In the minerals sector, companies do not appear to make use of international 
case studies either for ‘studying up’ on workable approaches or for comprehensively 
understanding the consequences of resettlement for their business. For displaced persons, 
relying on the cost of conflict as a ‘driver’ for better planning outcomes must seem perverse. 
However, without the potential for high cost remediation, present day institutional 
mechanisms and related corporate policy frameworks essentially enable an unplanned, 
limited liability, forced displacement, with few real consequences. 
4. Mining, resettlement planning and the crisis of development 
The crisis of development that Dwevidi has described is of immediate relevance to 
resettlement policy and practice in mining. While the broader development caused 
displacement debate has not focused a great deal of attention on the particular dynamics of 
the mining sector, the fundamental questions about the primacy of human rights, the 
responsibilities of state actors in formulating nationally beneficial development policies, the 
balances and controls placed on private sector activity, and the reach of extra-national agents 
are all directly applicable.  
If we accept the view that unplanned resettlement can put people at significant risk, and at the 
same time are realistic that mining resettlements will continue, searching conversations need 
to be had about how to confront risk and impact. We are interested in exploring whether there 
is scope for a more responsible form of planning to come to the fore; one that more readily 
accounts for the particularities of the mining industry and the challenges associated with 
planning in this context. From our perspective, the radical and managerialist positions are not 
entirely contradictory. One focuses on detailing risks and trauma, the other on instruments to 
control against those risks and impacts. Whatever type or category of managerial or advocacy 
response might emerge, the reality and enormity of resettlement risks and trauma must be 
acknowledged as its starting point. This is the territory that we believe holds promise if 
planning is able to provide a legitimate and effective safeguard in mining.  
In one key sense, we are in agreement with the radicals. The impacts of mining caused 
displacement and resettlement can be devastating and unacceptable. Where we diverge is on 
the question of how to respond. We suggest that trauma can be the focus of planning 
processes, not only grounds from which to avoid development that displaces. From this 
perspective, current management practice, as it is applied to mining, is problematic for a 
number of practical reasons. To begin with, standard setting is based in a soft form of 
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regulation that is not well enforced, and not immediately relevant to the mining industry. 
Moreover, there could be better institutional supports to ensure that project-affected people 
have access to ‘front-end’ resources to level the playing field during planning phase. Global 
mining companies do not have, and are not investing in (particularly in the current market 
downturn), building the requisite capability, knowledge and expertise to identify and mitigate 
resettlement risks, and governments tend to focus on the revenue that can be generated from 
development projects and not the local crisis created by physical and economic displacement.  
We understand that these points can be used both as a justification to avoid resettlement, and 
as the grounds for local communities to oppose projects that will trigger displacement effects. 
We also understand that large mining projects will continue to receive lender finance, legal 
permits from host governments, and positive economic signals from consumers in the form of 
market demand – even in the face of an increasingly strong justification for not displacing 
people. If projects are going to be approved, stronger controls are needed; a point which even 
the radicals must concede. Radicals will continue to lobby and oppose large scale mining 
projects, but if those efforts are unsuccessful, and the project proceeds, the expectation must 
be that the project then becomes ‘managed’ in some form. Project proponents may prefer to 
disregard the radical view, but this advocacy work can provide deep and valuable insights for 
companies and regulators if their aim is responsible management of the project.  
We are not pure managerialists. We seek to promote greater responsibility throughout the 
resettlement planning process with information and decision making available to all parties. 
The appeal of the current suite of international safeguards and performance standards is that 
they provide a common point of entry for interested and affected parties. Moreover, there is a 
clear connection between the approach represented in the standards and the business case 
logic of corporations. While we do not favour business case arguments in isolation, we do 
accept that this is a dominant mode for rationalising management action and can be helpful in 
beginning to push for better decisions and greater resourcing for resettlement planning 
efforts. We suggest that there is an unrealised utility in connecting the radical and managerial 
approaches that could be more fully developed to improve resettlement outcomes in mining.  
5.  From crisis of development to responsible planning 
In this section of the article, we return to the ‘responsibility’ approach advanced by Penz et 
al. (2011). For ‘responsible planning’ to provide a workable pathway, we suggest that three 
developments are necessary. First, mining companies must better engage the radical critique 
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in order to acknowledge and respond to the trauma that mining caused displacement can 
generate. Second, there needs to be a comprehensive commitment to maximising the 
voluntarism of displaced persons. This includes an acceptance that resettlement may not, or 
should not, proceed in situations where the risk to resettled people is too great, or that 
resettlement (and the mining project itself) may need to be delayed until the resettlement risks 
are better understood so that impacts are reduced to a level that is acceptable to affected 
persons. Thirdly, we suggest that greater participation and ‘choice’ in resettlement planning 
processes, risk identification, and overall decision making, is required. We engage these three 
developments in turn. 
 
The first development requires a searching and constructive dialogue between mining 
industry policy makers, project proponents and their critics. Generating this dialogue would 
require a significant shift in the way in which debates about mining and development are 
currently generated and reflected in policy and practice settings. Presently, the industry’s 
response to radicals manifests in two ways. The first is to discredit external critique. We have 
experienced this in the form of rebutting evidence as not credible enough to respond to, and 
discrediting the individuals or the institutions that represent community experiences and 
perspectives of trauma. The second response is to disengage from the material dimensions of 
the critique and engage with an ‘improvement’ discourse and to cast affected people as 
project beneficiaries instead of victims. This second type of response sees livelihood impacts 
nested within popularised management discourses, such as ‘social licence to operate’ 
(Thomson and Boutilier, 2011)  or ‘shared value’ (Porter and Kramer, 2011), which then 
becomes the focal point for companies, rather than the mitigation of material harms.  
 
Historically, the interface between the managerial and radical positions has been minimal, 
even in the face of mounting evidence. After decades of rebuttal and denial, it was only in 
2015 that the President of The World Bank finally conceded that there were “serious 
shortcomings” in the implementation of its resettlement policies. Given these kinds of 
admissions, for the mining industry to claim that the radical critique is not based on sound 
evidence, or is purely ideological, cannot be sustained. There is little doubt, therefore, that 
radical perspectives deserve greater consideration in debates about resettlement practice in 
mining, and incorporation into policy and practice. 
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The second development involves mining companies making a commitment to maximising 
the voluntaristic elements of the resettlement planning and implementation process. The 
current policy framework emphasizes avoidance of involuntary resettlement at the outset of a 
project in order to prevent unnecessary harm to potentially affected communities. This would 
involve designing the project from the outset in order to negate the need for resettlement. To 
do this would require a more intensive level of coordination between exploration, mine 
planning and community affairs than is currently evident at project start up. Research 
highlights that social and community professionals are largely treated as peripheral to core 
business; that is, brought in when issues hit crisis point, rather than being involved in mine 
design and planning decisions as a standard matter of process (Kemp and Owen, 2013).  
 
The avoidance approach can, however, have untoward consequences for local communities 
and host governments.  Downing (2014) has recently noted in his study of the Kosovo Power 
Project that companies will often defer responsibility for operational impacts up until a point 
where displacement is the only viable option. At the same time, avoidance can result in 
projects with sustained encroachment patterns and cause grave risks for community health 
and safety (Owen and Kemp, 2015). Under these circumstances, avoidance reduces both the 
level of voluntarism available to impacted communities, while companies look to shift their 
obligations for planning and management on to the external environment.    
 
Volition in involuntary resettlement is a difficult proposition (Schmidt-Soltau and 
Brockington, 2007). ‘Force’ is clearly a present factor when discussing front-end consent 
processes (Owen and Kemp, 2014). The strongest signal of volition is represented in the right 
to provide or deny consent at project start-up (Wilmsen and Wang, 2015). This is, however, 
not the only measure or opportunity for project affected people to exercise agency (Xue et al., 
2013). If a project involving involuntary resettlement has been approved, there are range of 
decisions that can likewise be shared with or withheld from local stakeholders. In current 
practice, the assumption is made that if an involuntary resettlement proceeds, and people do 
not agree or consent to being resettled, then the developer is responsible for controlling risk 
through the planning process, and this has come to include decisions about all elements 
relating to the resettlement.  
 
If we accept the premise that improved planning processes can reduce the likelihood of 
negative outcomes of mine displaced people, our argument is that current approaches to 
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planning should be radically improved. The third development for creating a workable 
pathway is therefore to extend the voluntaristic principle to include how resettled people 
operationalise their own relocation and resettlement activities. Amongst other things, this 
would include people making decisions about where and when they move, how they are 
moved, and the resources needed to restore livelihoods. Resettlement risks are often 
compounded by the imposition of subsequent decisions made on behalf of affected persons. 
Resettled people are often reported to have participated in resettlement planning, having been 
presented with bounded choices, limited information and compressed timeframes. The 
pathway to responsible planning must include a deeper commitment to participation of 
resettled people in the planning process; from permitting decisions and design through to 
implementation and monitoring.  
6. Conclusion 
In the early stages of our article we identified a point of fracture around the management of 
development caused displacement risks and impact. In response, we have introduced the 
proposition of ‘responsible planning’ as one way of engaging the material realities associated 
with displacement brought about by mining. The functionality of planning as a safeguard 
against resettlement risks in mining needs to be situated within the context described above. 
We argue that due to the uncertain nature of the mining industry, the distinction between 
‘planned’ and ‘unplanned’ development activity that forms the basis of industry policy 
frameworks is hard to reconcile. We suggest that planning for mining caused displacement 
and resettlement must account for both the planned and unplanned elements of mining. 
Unless planning for resettlement better accounts for mining’s unplanned elements, it may not 
be the safeguard that it is so readily assumed to be.  
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• Reviews existing international standards and safeguards for resettlement. 
• Analysis of application of international standards and safeguards to mining specific cases.  
• Key planning risks and challenges highlighted. 
• Barriers to improved planning practice explored. 
 
